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The original problem was formalized by Arrow in the following way:
given two or more individuals and supposing that each individual defines a (crisp) complete linear order over a fixed set of alternatives, can we always define in an ethical way a social (crisp) complete linear order corresponding to the given profile of social opinions?
Therefore, it was assumed that each individual was able to define in a consistent way which alternative was the best among any possible pair of alternatives, and so for the group itself. Two basic approaches can be found in fuzzy literature, depending on how intensities of preferences are introduced. In [4] for example, it is assumed that individuals and group opinions are given in terms of fuzzy sets of feasible alternatives, so that each individual i defines a degree /_Li(x) of feasibility for each alternative x. These feasibility values have to be aggregated into social degrees of feasibility /x(x). Moreover, the set of individuals is not a priori fixed and social values are obtained through a successive aggregation of individual opinions, in a one by one fashion. The main result in [4] shows that only a class of mixed rules were possible in that context (see example 4.2). As it was proven in [5] , the reason for such a restrictive result is based on the fact that the model does not take into account the number of individuals supporting each alternative, which does not seem to be ethical.
More coherently with Arrow's welfare approach is to assume fuzzy binary preference relations. In this case, individual degrees of preference
I~i(x, y) of the alternative x over the alternative y are defined for each pair of alternatives. These preferences have then to be aggregated into social preferences /z(x, y). In [1, 2] , it was pointed out that the ethical conditions were not the key point in Arrow's problem (i.e., inconsistency of collections of reasonable ethical conditions), as much as the underlying idea of rationality (only complete linear orders were assumed). Indeed, in [6] the key point allowing to obtain a positive result in the Arrowian framework is the weakness of transitivity of fuzzy binary relations. If we substitute weak-transitivity with max-min transitivity, then the impossibility will appear. Obviously, some ethical conditions must also be assumed in the fuzzy context as well as some degree of rationality for the preference relations.
In this paper we will assume non-inconsistent (i.e., non-absolutely irrational in the sense of [1, 2] ) complete fuzzy preference relations. The hypothesis of completeness has traditionally been assumed to formalize comparability between pairs of alternatives. More recently in [7] , completeness has been proposed as a measure of support of the set of alternatives. Here, we will follow this second idea and we will assume completeness with the intended meaning that all individuals consider the set of alterna-tives, on which they are expressing their opinion, feasible and comprehensive. In this paper, the amalgamation of preferences will not be obtained according to Arrow's model (rules for a fixed set of alternatives) but through intensity aggregation rules that will allow the successive aggregation of alternatives. This approach seems to be in principle more realistic, because for instance most committees begin to analyze a problem without an a priori fixed number of final alternatives to be voted upon.
To clarify the above comment consider a faculty search committee. First, apart from the number of applications, they set some rules that will guide the decision process. Then, once the deadline for the applications expires, they start reviewing the candidates whose CV's have already arrived. Some candidates are discarded and some remain and will be compared to new ones, whose CV's will be received later on. Starting the faculty search as early as possible speeds up the decision process, therefore aggregation rules that are independent from the number of alternatives are clearly needed.
RATIONALITY AS A FUZZY PROPERTY
Let #: X × X ~ [0, 1] be a fuzzy preference relation over an arbitrary finite set of alternatives X. /z(x,y) represents the degree to which the relation x not worse than y holds. Let us assume that g is complete in the sense that Then, the values
can be understood, respectively, as the degree to which the two alternatives are indifferent (xly), the degree of strict preference of x over y, (xBy, x is better than y) and the degree of strict preference of y over x (xWy, x is worse than y). Hence, fuzzy preferences are modeled according to a fuzzy partition with three classes, in such a way that We say that a cycle is rational if it is not irrational. Then, given any fuzzy preference p~ over a fixed set of alternatives and a chain of alternatives, we can look for all possible rational cycles of preferences, weigh them in a natural way and assign to the chain a degree of rationality.
For example, given a chain (x -x) with only one alternative, we obtain two distinct cycles, xBx and xlx, of which only xlx is a rational cycle. The degree of rationality of such a chain (x -x) will be just ~t(x, x). If we consider the chain (x-yx) with two alternatives, only the cycles xByWx, xWyBx and xlylx, are rational. So, we can propose
as the natural degree of rationality for such a two-element chain. This procedure can be extended to chains containing three or more alternatives, by adding along all possible rational cycles the product of the intensities associated to each preference in such a cycle. For example, the chain (x -y -z -x) with three alternatives gives the following 13 rational cycles.
xByBzWx xBylzWx xByWzBx xByWzlx xByWzWx xlyBzWx xlylzlx xlyWzBx xWyBzBx xWyBzlx xWyBzWx xWylzBx xWyWzBx and 14 irrational cycles. So, the degree of rationality associated to such a chain will be 
Au(G) = E A(C).
C ~ rat.cycles
We will now prove that A~(G) verifies 
which implies that 2.5 holds. Fixed a finite set of alternatives X, in view of 2.5, rationality can be defined as a fuzzy property A: J°(X) ~ [0, 1] with A(/x) = minAs(G) (2.6) G and where .~(X) is the set of all complete fuzzy preferences. The degree of rationality is then associated to the minimum degree of acyclicity along all chains (see [1, 2] ).
Notice that complete fuzzy preference relations can be absolutely rational (i.e., A(/-0 = 1) or absolutely irrational (i.e., A(t~) = 0) without being a crisp preference relation, as we will show in the next two examples. Obviously, a crisp complete order will be absolutely rational if it is a linear order and absolutely irrational otherwise. EXAMPLE 2.1 Let us consider the following fuzzy preference relation defined on the set of alternatives {x, y, z} as:
Such a fuzzy preference is absolutely irrational, that is A(/x) = 0. Indeed,
Therefore, from 2.5 we have A(~) = 0.
[] EXAMPLE 2.2 Let us consider now the fuzzy pre~rence ~ defined on the set of alternatives {x, y, z} as:
and, from 2.5 we have A(~) = 1.
[] In the following sections we will deal with the amalgamation of complete fuzzy preferences /x which are non absolutely irrational. As it has been proven in [8] , if the set of alternatives X is fixed then there exist aggregation rules that assure non-irrational social preferences for all possible profiles of n non absolutely irrational individual opinions. That is the case, for example, of the mean rule, defined for x, y ~ X as 27= ~ ~i(x, y)
As pointed out previously, we will not suppose that the set of alternatives is fixed and a necessary and sufficient condition for such non-irrational rules is given, generalizing in this way a partial result given in [9] .
INTENSITY AMALGAMATION RULES AND ETHICAL CONDITIONS
Once a group of n >_ 2 individuals is fixed, we should be able to aggregate their opinions about any set of alternatives in a coherent way. Therefore, we have to define aggregation operations that can take into account any extra alternative x so to properly extend any previous aggregated opinion relative to a collection of alternatives not containing x. Our proposal is based upon amalgamation mappings that will allow us the successive amalgamation of alternatives preferences one by one, and the key properties are the standard conditions Unrestricted Domain (UD): the aggregation rule is defined over all possible profiles of fuzzy preferences.
Under these conditions, we propose the following definition 
. txn(x,y)).
It is clear that if we also assume a standard neutrality condition in order to assure that the same intensity aggregation mapping 4' will be associated to any pair of alternatives, each possible aggregation procedure is characterized by one of these intensity aggregation mappings. Such a neutrality condition is: Neutrality (N): given any permutation of the set of alternatives 7r, if #(x, y) = ld(Tr(x), 7r(y)) for all i = 1, 2,..., n and any pair of alternative x, y, then
For the time being, we will suppose that conditions IIA, UD, N hold. Some ethical conditions may also be imposed to the intensity aggregation rules: Non-Dictatorship (ND): there is no individual i such that ~b(a 1 , a 2 ..... a n) = a i
It is easy to see that PR implies NNR, A implies ND and U implies CS. NNR (or PR) and CS together imply that ~b(1,..., 1) and ~b(0 ..... 0) = 0. At any rate, conditions NNR, CS and A can be considered a must in a general context and they are not in fact inconsistent. Many aggregation rules verifying all of the above conditions (or a meaningful subset of them) can be defined. For instance, the mean rule defined in 2.7. satisfies all the of the above conditions.
NON-IRRATIONAL INTENSITY AGGREGATION RULES
Following [9] , absolute rationality cannot be claimed in many practical situations even for individuals. So, we should look for some non-absolute irrationality results. Notice that any possibility result in this context will justify the search for aggregation rules that are in some sense as good as possible. Therefore, we ask whether or not there exist aggregation rules assuring non-absolutely irrational aggregated preferences, according to the following definition. [] Notice that we are using the terms rational or non-irrational when referring to procedures that lead respectively to rational or irrational cycles. Notice as well that both individual and social opinions are required to belong to the set of Non-Absolutely Irrational (NAI) complete fuzzy preference relations. Therefore, we are in fact modifying the Unrestricted Domain condition.
For example, the minimum rule 
. n. •
In view of Lemma 4.1., we say that an aggregation rule 4) is complete if and only if 4)(aX,..., a n) + 4)(bl,..., b n) > 1 whenever a i + b i > 1 for all i --1,2 ..... n.
A useful characterization of complete intensity aggregations is given by the following theorem. Proof If a i + b i > 1 for all i = 1, 2 ..... n, then in view of NNR it must be 4)(a 1 ..... a n) + 4)(ba,...,b n) > 4)(a 1 .... ,a n) + 4)(1 -a 1 ..... 1 -a n) >1.
The converse is trivial.
The following results allow us to characterize our non-irrational aggregation rules. 
Proof Suppose first that 4> is complete and verifies conditions (i)-(ii).
Given an arbitrary chain of alternatives G - (x 1 -x 
xlPlx2P2 "'" Xh-lPh -lxhBxh+I "'" xkWxk+l "'" XmPmXl
This cycle will be rational no matter how we define Ph' in {W, I, B} for any h' different from h and k. Moreover, since for any pair (Xh', xj,+ l)
~B(Xh',Xh'+I) + m(Xh',Xh'+l) + ~w(Xh',Xh'+J) = 1,
it must be the case that at least one of the three values above is greater then zero. So, by choosing one of such positive values for each h', we can certainly build a rational cycle for G whose weight is greater than zero. Therefore, A~,(G) > O. 
/x(x, y)/~(y, z)p~(z, x) +/.~(y, x)t~(z, y)p,(x, z) -2txt(x,y)p~(y,z)l~l(Z,X ) = I~(z,x) + I~(x,z) = 1
which implies that A(/~) = 0. So, /~ is irrational, which contradicts the initial hypothesis.
CASE 2:
(ii) is not verified. Therefore, there exists (a 1 ..... a n) ~ [0, 1] n such that 4~(al,..., a n) = 1 with a j < 1 for some j. (ii) follows immediately from PR.
• Rational Amalgamation Operations 339 1 1 Therefore, /x is irrational for a = ~ and non complete for a < ~. 1 Let us then fix 7 < a < 1. It is clear that condition (ii) is verified. Let us then prove that condition (i) also holds.
We Notice that all of the intensity aggregation rules given in the examples above, verify NNR, A, U, CS, and ND.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES
It is clear that one of the key points of our approach is that we suppose no knowledge about the number of alternatives. We assumed that NAI intensity aggregation rules should never lead to absolute irrationality, independently from the number of alternatives.
In our context, of course, there is no decision problem when their is only one feasible alternative x, and we expect absolute rationality. Indeed, the values /zg(x, x) = 1 for all i could have been easily assumed by hypothesis, and then the aggregated value, under general ethical conditions, would have been /~(x, x) = 1.
If there are just two feasible alternatives we could say that in fact there are no irrational rules. Notice that the preference values tz(x,y) and /z(y, x) will never lead by themselves to absolute irrationality, because in view of equation Therefore, any intensity aggregation rule will produce aggregated preferences /z such that A~(G) > 0 for all chains G with two elements. This is consistent with Arrow's crisp model that does not lead to an Impossibility Theorem when the number of alternatives is either one or two. In general, ethical rules with absolute rationality are not possible in the crisp context when three or more alternatives are present, but they are possible if the absolute rationality condition is dropped out.
Finally, it must be noticed that in proving the necessity part of Theorem 4.2. we needed long chains. Indeed, when condition (ii) does not hold, irrationality is proven for long chains with more alternatives than individuals. Such a characterization does not hold if the number of alternatives has been a priori fixed and it is smaller than n, as it will be shown in the following example. This fact may suggest a search for additional assumptions leading to rules where short chains do not produce absolute irrationality for the aggregated values.
However, in this paper we did not want to impose any kind of restriction on the number of alternatives, so that an aggregation rule is considered to be non irrational if and only if no chain of any length can produce irrationality. EXAMPLE 5.1 Let us consider a group with n > 5 people and the following intensity aggregation rule:
It can be easily seen that ~0 is complete and it verifies NNR, A, and CS. Moreover, because it does not verify condition (ii) of Theorem 4.2., we can conclude that it is irrational. In this case, chains with six alternatives may lead to irrationality. However, any chain with three alternatives cannot lead to irrationality. Indeed, given a chain G = (x -y -z -x) two cases are possible Because all individuals are not irrational and for each individual the indifference cycle has weight zero, there must be at least five cycles with strict preferences whose weight is positive. Each of these five cycles must contain both a W and a B in order to be rational. So, for each individual we must put at least one element in a B-set and at least one element in a W-set and these two sets must correspond to different pairs. On the other hand, the total number of elements that we can put in W-sets is at most three. We then reach a contradiction. Because we have to put five elements in the W-sets it must be IW~,y)l > 3. Three of the elements in W~,y) must also belong either to B(y,z ~ or to B(~,x) for otherwise they would not be rational. Therefore, either B(y,z) or B(z,,) has two elements, which lets us conclude that/~ is a non-irrational.
IB(x,y)l
[] Generalizing Example 5.1. it can be analogously proven that k-element chains do not lead to irrationality of the rule ~p when the number of individuals is n > 2k -1.
The example above suggests that, in general, aggregation rules for which there are k-element chains with zero degree of rationality, will lead to longer chains with zero degree of rationality. This is consistent with our intuition that decision problems become more complex as the number of alternatives under consideration gets larger. The next result is based upon well-known results in social choice theory. Summing up, A~(G') = 0 and the theorem is proven. II
FINAL COMMENTS
It must be pointed out once again that the aggregation model here developed is restricted to aggregation rules that can be represented by a unique intensity aggregation rule, once conditions IIA, UD, and N have been assumed. As a direct consequence we have that these aggregation rules are defined without taking into account the number of alternatives. Therefore, Non-Absolutely Irrational (NAI) rules are those rules associated to intensity aggregation rules that will never lead to absolute irrationality. A characterization of these NAI rules has been given. By means of this characterization, the non-irrationality of many rules can be checked quite easily. Notice in particular the importance of Corollary 4.2. Any complete rule satisfying positive responsiveness, that is any complete rule which is sensitive to individual changes, is automatically a non-absolutely irrational intensity aggregation rule.
Moreover, it is obvious that if a given rule leads to k-element chains with zero degree of rationality, such a rule can never be considered in aggregation problems with more than k alternatives. In addition, notice that from Example 5.1 and Theorem 5.1 we can infer that ethical rules leading to k-element chains with zero degree of rationality will also lead to longer chains with zero degree of rationality. This shows that the number of alternatives makes in fact more complex (though still solvable) the aggregation problem. This fact is very well-known from practice, and it cannot be deduced from Arrow's paradox. Indeed, in such a crisp context we can simply conclude that only with two alternatives we can find (absolute) rationality. In our model, we have seen how the number of possible rules decreases with the number of alternatives from the case in which there are only two alternatives where no rule leads to absolute irrationality, to the general case with an unknown number of alternatives, where we have proven the existence of rules that never lead to irrationality.
